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Abstract 
Regional trade in South America since independence has long been much smaller 
than would be expected if geography were the only constraint on trade. Several 
potential explanations exist, including low technological and demand 
complementarities; low productivity; and high natural and policy barriers to trade. 
Focusing on the latter explanations, policy makers have long advocated a South 
American/Southern Cone Free Trade Area—proposed as early as 1889. Would 
reductions in trade costs have been sufficient to raise trade significantly, or was 
trade low for other reasons? We study bilateral trade between 1910 and 1950, when 
large external shocks altered global supply and demand. These shocks help us 
show that intra-regional trade could have been boosted by reductions in trade 
costs. South American regional trade could have benefited from more benign trade 
policies or better infrastructure. Regional trade in textiles, which took off from the 
1930s, supports our argument that trade improved when trade costs fell. 
Introduction 
Regional trade in South America since independence has long been much smaller 
than would be expected if the simple measures of geographic propinquity that 
proxy for transport and information costs, and which are so often favoured in the 
empirical literature, were the only constraint on trade.4 Several potential 
explanations exist. First, factor endowments were potentially sufficiently similar 
and goods so homogeneous that foreign competition could easily be driven out of 
domestic markets. A Ricardian view suggests an international division of labour 
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4 (Bulmer-Thomas 2014, 72); for the long trends on integration from Independence, see 
(Restrepo-Estrada and Tena-Junguito, 2018) 
driven by comparative advantage. Western Europe and the US specialized in 
manufactures while South America specialized in commodities, driving down the 
incentives for regional trade. Low levels of per capita income could matter if richer 
countries are more likely to engage in intra-industry trade. Finally, high regional 
trade costs may be to blame. Poor transport due to challenging geographic 
conditions, low population density, a lack of knowledge of local markets, political 
instability, poor financial infrastructure, and even preferences biased towards 
European goods may have limited the scope for Latin American trade. What do we 
know about how much trade costs mattered for regional trade integration? 
To provide a credible answer to this question, it is necessary to isolate periods 
when trade costs changed in an exogenous way. The two world wars provide such 
variation due to disruptions in global markets which made it relatively less costly 
to trade within the region. We leverage these shocks to improve our understanding 
of how much reasonable reductions in (relative) regional trade costs could have 
promoted regional trade. At the same time, if we find that trade costs do not 
matter, then we might infer that other structural forces on the supply or demand 
side might have been responsible for keeping trade down in this region.  
An early report by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America 
(ECLA) suggested that increased regional trade during the Second World War 
‘revealed a remarkable capacity for (trade) expansion’.5 On the other hand, 
Prebisch, Singer, and the viewpoint most often associated with ECLA held that the 
international division of labour forced Latin America into commodity production 
and supplying basic industrial inputs. Close neighbours would have limited 
demand for regional output in such a division of labour. Some evidence that trade 
costs matter comes from the vast literature on interwar and post-war policies. 
These often discriminated against foreign producers and national primary 
producers alike.6 These policies tended to diminish integration with the rest of the 
world and within the region compared with efforts in south-east Asia. In this 
article, we focus on the potential for lower trade costs to generate greater regional 
trade in the period 1910–50. If trade costs matter, then the ideation of an 
international division of labour as the only explanation for low regional trade 
would seem to lose some of its lustre. 
We present evidence on the level and evolution of international integration for five 
South American nations comparing their regional trade flows against those with a 
set of countries outside the region. To do this, we first consider the evolution of 
trade shares. We then present information on regional trade costs as defined by 
(Jacks, Meissner, and Novy 2011).7 This measure captures a broad range of 
barriers to trade, including freight rates, tariffs, non-tariff barriers, information 
costs, consumer preferences, and beachhead costs of establishing new markets. In 
contrast with the work of (Jacks, Meissner, and Novy 2011), who studied 
integration over the long run for a set of leading countries, we focus on a set of less 
developed countries in a period of de-globalization with several sizeable shocks to 
the world economy (Jacks, Meissner, and Novy 2011). Using this methodology, we 
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7 (Jacks, Meissner, and Novy 2008; Jacks, Meissner, and Novy 2011). 
are able to quantify the idea that South American nations had much higher trade 
costs between themselves than with their non-South American trade partners in 
almost every year between 1910 and 1950.  
Moreover, despite these high levels, there are interesting periods in our sample 
when regional integration rose and regional trade costs fell in relative terms, with 
the causes being external to structural and policy changes in these economies. In 
this context, the shocks of the world wars made for a more favourable environment 
for regional economic integration.8 We consider the war periods as ‘natural 
experiments’ that can help provide clues as to whether trade costs were an 
important driver of regional integration. This plausibly exogenous variation in 
trade shares allows us to evaluate, under limited, albeit potentially non-innocuous 
assumptions, how much trade could be expected to rise for a given fall in trade 
costs. In other words, while ECLA was optimistic in 1957 that lower trade costs 
could help raise regional trade, one question left unanswered is: by exactly how 
much?9 
We focus on a difference-in-differences-in-differences specification based on a 
theoretically grounded gravity model of trade. We study changes in trade during 
the wars among a set of five South American trade partners relative to the changes 
in exports from those countries to non-South American partners and relative to 
changes in exports of a group of eight non-South American exporters. Our third 
difference relies on comparing these flows to domestic trade or expenditure. Our 
gravity approach allows us to control for supply and demand shocks and to isolate 
the impact of trade cost shocks on regional integration emanating from these 
wartime market disruptions (Head and Mayer 2015).  
In identifying whether trade costs mattered for regional integration, we must note 
that supply and demand changes, as opposed to trade costs, could be behind the 
observed rise in regional trade. A lack of competition from European imports might 
have allowed regional producers, who typically produced at a higher cost or with 
lower quality, temporarily to satisfy domestic and regional demand. After 
controlling for these shocks, it appears that higher physical trade costs associated 
with disruptions to international shipping to Europe appear to have diverted trade 
into the region. The idea that (relative) trade costs mattered is validated.   
We also approach this issue with direct evidence on observable trade costs, such as 
freight rates and diplomatic initiatives. We also have detailed information on 
international trade and production in the textile sector. Evidence from Brazil in the 
1930s and 1940s reveals that trade costs, broadly defined, limited regional trade in 
these types of industrial goods.  
We have little light to shed on the political economy of trade policy in South 
America at this time and how these debates were settled. The likelihood of policy 
changes and investments in trade-promoting infrastructure to promote regional 
trade is beyond the scope of this article. Still, we do provide some evidence that a 
strategy promoting regional or international integration with lower costs of doing 
trade might have had some success in generating regional trade had it been tried 
with greater vigour. 
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9 (ECLAC 1956). 
Our starting point—empirical models based on modern trade theory—may seem 
anachronistic and even ahistorical. Nevertheless, they are quite adaptable and 
general. We explain below the virtues of applying this kind of structure to the data. 
Furthermore, analysis of these issues through this lens dates back to 
contemporaries such as John A. Hopkins, a US economist, who authored a report in 
1944 for the Argentinian Trade Promotion Corporation (Corporación para la 
Promoción del Intercambio). There he discussed the importance of market size, 
spillovers, and other forces that are still emphasized today in the new economic 
geography literature.  
In what follows, we capitalize on modern econometric and economic methodology to 
assess whether regional trade had any prospects based on changes in trade costs. 
Along the way, we attempt to eliminate factor endowments and low incomes as two 
factors that might have limited trade. What we are left with is a view of 
international trade and development, well before the post-Second World War 
period, that is amenable to analysis using the tools of modern trade theory. 
Part I 
Regional trade in Latin America has long been low, especially when compared to 
regional trade in Europe, North America, and even Asia (see figure 1). Figure 2 
shows the share of exports among Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Peru 
(hereafter SA5) over total exports for these five countries. The First World War 
brought an increase from around 5 per cent to a maximum of almost 8 per cent in 
1918. The global crisis of the 1930s produced a drop to 4.6 per cent in 1931. 
However, it was during the Second World War that regional trade expanded 
significantly, to 13.5 per cent by 1945. By way of comparison, for Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, the regional share was roughly 23 per cent 
in 1930. Maizels reports a similar figure for total intra-European trade shares of 34 
per cent in 1929.10  
One other question could be asked at this point: how much of this regional trade 
increase can be attributed to any given country? Figure 3 shows the share of each 
SA5 country in total imports for the four other neighbours. Argentina was 
dominant until the Second World War, with a minimum share of 3.5 per cent in 
1920 to a maximum of 15.5 per cent in 1932, but from 1941 onwards Brazil clearly 
surpassed Argentina. In 1944 Brazil had a share of 18 per cent, far higher than 
that of Argentina, which was less than 7 per cent. Peru and Chile were also 
fighting for a second position in regional markets. Both countries had a share of 
close to 4 per cent in regional markets during the Second World War. Finally, 
Bolivia never represented more than 0.3 per cent. Surprisingly, the regional trade 
share of Argentina declined in the Second World War period, which has often been 
attributed to close connections with British as well as German markets.11  
A closely related view of the changes is evident in figure 4, which shows the share 
of total exports for each of our SA5 countries destined for the remaining four 
countries. Peru stands out, with a secularly rising trade share after the First World 
War. For most of the other countries the export shares remain low throughout the 
period with the exception of the wars. Chile and Brazil register short-lived blips 
upward c. 1918–19. Brazil, Chile, and Peru see more sustained rises in the Second 
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World War period, at least doubling their export shares to the region relative to the 
immediate prewar experience. 
While the regional trade boom during the Second World War was largely a 
Brazilian/Argentinian story, about 55 per cent of the rise in regional trade was 
evenly spread across the other smaller partners. Figure 5 shows the share of the 
rise of total regional imports for each SA5 country accounted for by each of the 
other four South American source countries. To eliminate noise, we take the three-
year centred averages for each of the endpoints (1939 and 1945). The height of the 
bars in figure 5 represents the percentage share of the total change in imports from 
the South American region accounted for by a particular source country. We then 
break these percentage shares down by the four possible destinations. For example, 
Brazilian exports to Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Bolivia account for 55 per cent of 
the total rise in imports from sample South American partners. Roughly 80 per 
cent of this share is accounted for by Argentina’s imports from Brazil. Chile 
contributed 21 per cent to the total rise in imports from the region and Argentina 
for nearly 8 per cent.  
Not all of these changes were driven by traditional commodity exports. In fact, 
manufactures represented almost 57 per cent of Argentinian exports to Bolivia, 44 
per cent to Peru (1943), 33 per cent to Chile (1941), and 31 per cent to Brazil 
(1946). Brazilian exports of manufactures to Argentina reached 43 per cent in 
1945. Moreover, the weight of manufactures in regional trade for Chilean imports 
increased from 6.7 per cent in 1936 to 35.7 per cent in 1943. Clearly this was a 
significant increase in manufacturing exports over historical trade patterns, 
whereby these nations previously relied heavily on Europe and the US for such 
products.  
Figure 6 shows a measure of regional trade intensity for Chile in textile goods. This 
measure compares the share of Chilean imports for textiles from four regions 
(South America, Europe, the UK, and the US) in total imports of that industry to 
the share of total Chilean imports coming from that region. Regional integration 
was generally low in textiles, but near the end of Second World War, by this 
measure, regional integration almost surpassed that of the US and continental 
Europe, although it never reached the levels observed for the UK. During the war, 
the US did not entirely fill in for the missing European trade. Greater regional 
integration, even in manufactures, was far from categorically impossible.  
Part II 
We now turn away from looking at trade shares and instead examine the Head–
Ries measure of trade costs, a theoretically motivated measure of bilateral trade 
integration. The Head–Ries measure is inversely related to the ratio of bilateral 
trade to total expenditure on domestic output.12 The trade cost measure is high 
when bilateral trade is low relative to the domestic benchmark. Trade diversion or 
third country effects and general equilibrium effects are accounted for by the 
domestic trade benchmark, as discussed in (Jacks, Meissner, and Novy 2011). 
Trade costs, in ad valorem equivalent percentage terms, are given by: 
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   (1) 
where s indexes a source/exporting country, d indexes a destination/importer, and 
 denotes domestic absorption (proxied by GDPss – exportsss),  is exports from 
s to d, and σ is the elasticity of substitution across all goods. We assume that σ 
equals 8, as in (Jacks, Meissner, and Novy 2011). Various underlying structures of 
trade, including a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) demand system with the 
Armington assumption (that is, each product is differentiated based on its origin), a 
Ricardian model of trade in ‘homogeneous’ goods, and a trade model of firms with 
heterogeneous levels of productivity, give rise to identical measures of trade costs. 
Reallocation of a constant value of exports from one partner to another partner will 
lower the bilateral trade cost measure even in the absence of real changes in the 
cost of doing trade with the partner to which trade is re-allocated. By definition, 
trade costs are a relative measure, with the benchmark being the costs of domestic 
trade. Domestic trade costs are assumed to be the same across countries, which is 
an obvious simplification but not overly problematic. In any case, our regression 
results later will relax this constraint. 
Figure 7 shows that this comprehensive measure of trade costs for our South 
American sample was higher than between our sample and six trade partners in 
Europe, Japan, and the US.  
After controlling for economic size (a function of the endowment of factors of 
production as well as total factor productivity), the South American countries in 
our sample seemed to face high barriers to trade in the region. Despite the fact that 
South American nations are on average half the distance from their European 
trade partners, average trade costs were roughly 30 per cent higher within the 
region.  
Two periods of sharply lower trade costs for South America stand out, and these 
coincide directly with the wars. There is also a narrowing between the two lines 
from the early 1930s. All of this suggests that major economic shocks such as the 
Depression and the world wars may have facilitated trade in South America, at 
least in relative terms. Based on the assumed elasticity of substitution 8, trade 
costs fell for South American country pairs by about 12 per cent 1913–18 and 
1938–44.13 An elasticity of 3.78 yields a fall of 29 per cent in both periods and an 
elasticity of 12 yields declines of about 8.5 per cent. All of these regional declines 
are much larger than the declines for country pairs where only one partner is in 
South America.14 In addition we note a secular rise in trade costs against non-
South American partners from the early 1920s. This rise could be explained, in 
                                               
13 Specifically, this is the geometric average of the ad valorem equivalent, as outlined in 
(Jacks, Meissner, and Novy 2010). 
14 These changes in trade costs are for a balanced panel of country-pairs where both 
countries are in our Latin American sample and for pairs where only one country was in 
Latin America (and where trade is not zero). Since the trade cost measure imposes an 
elasticity of substitution, about which we have no reliable information, we provide three 
estimates corresponding to elasticities which fall within the range of plausible estimates in 
the literature. Our preferred elasticity, in line with (Jacks, Meissner, and Novy 2011), is 8. 
(Federico and Tena-Junguito 2017), use an elasticity of 3.78 which is the median in a meta-
study of the recent literature by (Head and Mayer 2015). We also provide estimates with a 
very conservative elasticity of 12. 
part, by rising protectionism in our South American countries which discriminated 
in favour of South American partners.  
The accelerated decline of trade costs during the wars has many potential 
explanations. Tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and exchange controls might have 
favoured regional trade. Some anecdotal evidence is available to suggest this was 
the case. Likewise, improved domestic and international transport links might also 
have made commerce between these nations easier. Equally, the trade cost 
measure can also fall when it becomes relatively easy to trade such that trade is 
‘diverted’ into the region, whether ‘away’ from domestic markets or from exports 
that would have otherwise gone outside the region. For example, wartime 
disruptions to trade networks (beyond supply and demand changes) and the 
autarkic policies of the 1930s in Europe may also be associated with higher 
regional trade integration and hence lower regional trade costs when measured 
this way. Other forces for which we have no direct evidence, but which seem less 
plausible, might be an increased difficulty of trading domestically, which would 
spur international trade. A rise in the elasticity of substitution, or lower mark-ups, 
could also give rise to greater integration. If the latter were true, then it would 
suggest a stiffening of competition over time as goods became better substitutes for 
each other, perhaps as industrialization took hold and so forth. While this latter 
force is an interesting possibility, we have no reason to believe that the preference 
structure and the industrial organization changed so dramatically within the 
region over such a short time, and economists generally believe such variables are 
fairly stable.  
There are multiple other potential explanations for the generally high level of trade 
costs prior to 1950. One common argument is that South American nations lacked 
technological complementarity, perhaps because of too great of a similarity in 
factor endowments. This view is hard to sustain, at least within our five-nation 
sample. First, it is unlikely that the factor endowments of countries with such 
disparate climates and resource endowments as Brazil, Peru, and Argentina were 
so similar so as to negate trade. While it is true that land/labour ratios were 
elevated in all cases, the primary products of each country were highly 
differentiated from each other. It was not uncommon for Brazil to export coffee, 
cotton, and mate in exchange for Argentinian wheat and hides. More broadly, in 
1913 the main export of Brazil was coffee, for Argentina it was corn, for Chile it 
was nitrate, for Bolivia it was tin, and for Peru it was copper (Bulmer-Thomas 
2014). A ‘love of variety’ in such goods could have easily generated demand for 
regional goods. The best possible explanation for low regional integration under our 
assumptions seems to be high trade costs. 
Differences in GDP per capita (in absolute values) have been used to test for the 
nature of international trade. A positive relationship to bilateral would suggest 
inter-industry trade. A negative sign would be consistent with the Linder 
hypothesis predicting that countries with similar levels of GDP per capita will 
trade more. Accordingly, we ran, but do not report, two gravity regressions that 
include the absolute value of the log differences in GDP per capita. The first model 
follows the gravity approach in Jacks et al. and allows for multilateral resistance 
with a control for GDP minus total exports. The second model is a standard gravity 
model that includes three new variables: first, a size measure; second, similarity in 
size; and third, differences in the log of GDP per capita. In neither specification 
was the term involving (absolute) differences in GDP per capita statistically 
significant. On the other hand, overall size of the two partners and similarity in 
size of GDP are statistically significant. These results are evidence in favour of an 
Armington approach which identifies goods with their origin and considers trade in 
differentiated goods.  
Yet another possible explanation is that European producers supplied higher 
quality goods, eliminating South American trade in industrial goods. This is 
plausible, but unfortunately, we have no good way of measuring quality per se, 
given the available data. It is worthwhile noting that the trade costs measure is 
based on two-way trade. If trade costs are high, it is because imports and exports 
alike are low. Low quality would have dissuaded foreign consumers anywhere in 
the world from purchasing South American exports. Instead we see that after 
controlling for the size of supply and demand, the South American nations in our 
sample had a relatively difficult time gaining market share close to home but not 
abroad.15 
Part III 
In this section we explore the determinants of South American regional trade and 
trade costs with the help of a novel dataset on bilateral trade for five South 
American countries with eight European and North American trade partners 
between 1910 and 1950.16 We use a gravity model of trade consistent with many 
different modern models of international trade. The gravity model attempts to 
explain variation in bilateral exports, as opposed to seeking an explanation for 
patterns of specialization. We rely on gravity rather than pursuing the 
determinants of the Head–Ries trade cost measure because the latter are only 
defined when there is positive trade. In many instances in our sample, especially 
during the world wars, trade fell to zero, implying infinite (variable) trade costs or 
at least significant fixed costs of bilateral trade. Instead, our gravity models do not 
ignore zero observations. We use the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) 
estimator as suggested by Santos Silva and Tenreyro and by (Head and Mayer 
2015; Silva and Tenreyro 2006). 
Our baseline estimating equation is: 
( ) ( ) '1 2 ·sdt sd sd t sdt dt dt sdtx exp SA SA WAR X s d   = + + + + +  ò  (2) 
where, xsd is nominal exports between a source (s) and a destination (d), SA is an 
indicator equal to one if both countries in the pair are located in South America, 
WAR is an indicator for the periods comprising either the First World War or the 
Second World War, and X includes a set of traditional gravity variables that proxy 
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Tena-Junguito and Willebald 2013). For trade among European countries and the US, we 
have relied on (Jacks, Meissner, and Novy 2011). Online app. S1 gives more information. 
for several significant trade costs highlighted in the literature: the logarithm of 
shipping distance in nautical miles between principal ports (time-varying due to 
the opening of the Panama Canal), a shared language dummy, a common land 
border indicator, and an indicator equal to one if both countries are on the gold 
standard. The last set of variables includes period-specific exporter (s) and 
importer (d) dummies which control both for economic size as well as what 
(Anderson and van Wincoop 2003). Time dummies are subsumed by the year-
specific constant/exporter reference country along with the country–time 
interactions. These fixed effects control for factors that shape trade with all trade 
partners relative to the dyad in question, as well as productivity and demand 
shocks affecting trade and production for both the producer and consumer country. 
These dummies and their interactions with the year variables make it possible to 
use nominal instead of real trade. Finally, we also include a pair-specific error 
term.  
Regressions of this form will allow a difference-in-differences-in-differences 
interpretation of the impact of trade cost changes during and due to the world 
wars. Additionally, if we assume a particular elasticity of substitution, we can 
recover an estimate of the size of the trade cost shock of the war. We emphasize the 
following two points. 
First,  allows us to know whether after controlling for geography, other 
observable trade costs, economic size, and productivity, South American nations 
export less to each other. If this coefficient is negative and statistically significant, 
it is consistent with high regional trade costs in South America. 
Second, we would like to know whether a decline in (relative) trade costs allows 
South American countries to trade more. Since trade cost changes are typically 
endogenous to pre-existing trends and unobservable policy, we focus on the 
wartime shocks to isolate a plausibly exogenous shock to such costs. Specifically,  
is the difference-in-differences-in-differences coefficient of interest, which measures 
the rise in intra-South American trade (the treatment group) during a given war 
relative to both non-South American destinations and non-South American exports 
to all destinations in our sample (the control group). The third difference is the 
comparison to changes in domestic trade. We use the world wars as a natural 
experiment. These shocks are not obviously contemporaneously associated with or 
caused by shocks to South American productivity, supply, or demand. Moreover, we 
assume that trade policy and other trade costs in South American nations did not 
react directly, in expectation of or concurrently to the shock of the wars. Instead we 
rely on a global shock to trade that changed the relative costs of engaging in 
international trade. Finally, we assume that in the absence of the shock trade 
patterns for South American pair countries and non-South American pairs would 
have evolved (conditional on observables) in a similar way. 
While regional trade shares seem to have risen during the wars, it is impossible to 
know whether this is because South American nations became globally more 
competitive as foreign suppliers went offline, or whether the relative cost of 
regional trade fell. However, we can discriminate between these forces with the 
structure of the gravity model. The time-varying importer and exporter fixed 
effects control for supply and demand shocks affecting trade levels across all 
partners. For instance, if nations become more competitive, or if demand falls 
across all partners, trade should change equally across all partners conditional on 
other observables.  
If the coefficients on the interaction terms on South America and the wars are 
insignificant after including these controls for supply and demand, then we can 
argue that the rise in trade shares during the wars is very likely attributable to 
changes in competitiveness, supply, demand, or trade diversion. This implies that 
nascent South American industry could produce for the regional market if global 
supply conditions were favourable or if producers could lower their output prices.  
Assume instead that we find the coefficient to be positive and significant, even 
after including time-varying country fixed effects. This is consistent with the idea 
that regional trade could have advanced with policies and other actions that 
reduced trade costs between nations in the region. Such a finding would validate 
the proposals of various policy players in the early twentieth century, including the 
Pan-American Union and Federico Pinedo, finance minister of Argentina, who 
lobbied extensively but unsuccessfully for a regional free-trade area in the late 
1930s and the early 1940s. 
Part IV 
Table 1 investigates the results of a difference-in-difference-in-differences strategy. 
We present various specifications including a subsample for the years 1910–18 
(column 1), 1935–45 (column 2), and the entire sample 1910–50 (column 3). In 
columns 6 and 7 we include controls for other periods as placebos and to control for 
pre-existing trends. 
The first row of table 1 shows that, in all specifications and after controlling for a 
number of other determinants, the South American countries exported less to each 
other. In column 1 this decrease is about 77 per cent; in column 2 it is 88 per cent; 
in column 3 it is valued at 74 per cent. Columns 1, 2, and 3 show evidence 
consistent with the idea that during both wars (relative) trade costs between the 
South American countries in our sample fell, causing trade to be higher in the 
region by about 80 per cent. All coefficients on the interaction terms of wars and 
South America are statistically significant. With an elasticity of substitution of 8, 
the average (relative) decline in the trade cost factor is equal to 11 per cent during 
the First World War and 13 per cent during the Second World War. These 
correspond very closely to the estimates in section I, based on values underlying 
figure 7. The difference here is that we do not impose unit income elasticities and 
we carefully delineate the ‘control’ and ‘treatment’ groups. As all regressions 
control for supply, demand, and trade diversion effects, we find strong evidence 
that the higher trade shares witnessed during the wars appear to have been driven 
by declines in regional trade costs. These declines should be interpreted as relative 
declines in trade costs, given our set-up. 
Part V 
We proceed with a number of robustness checks. Results in table 1, column 3 are 
qualitatively robust to omitting the dyads that include either Brazil or Argentina 
(columns 4 and 5). Our results do not rely solely on either country whose leaders 
attempted closer trade relations in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Columns 6 and 
7 check whether trade was abnormally high between South American pairs during 
the 1920s (1922–9) or the Great Depression (1929–38). We do not expect trade to be 
abnormally high or low in the 1920s, so we include this indicator in the spirit of a 
placebo test. Inspection of the trade shares in the 1930s reveals a potential rise in 
regional trade from the mid-1930s, pre-dating the Second World War. However, in 
neither case are the coefficients on these terms significant.  
We explore pre-existing trends further in table 2. Here we include an interaction 
between South American country pairs and a simple linear time trend (that is, the 
sample year minus 1909). Both time trends are positive and significant in the 
1910–18 and 1935–45 subsamples. Still, our wartime shocks are associated with 
significant coefficients. In column 1, the First World War is associated with higher 
trade in South America, though the point estimate is smaller than in table 1 (0.49 
vs. 0.72). In column 2, covering 1935–45, the coefficient of interest on the 
interaction term is no longer significant. In column 3 of table 2, which includes all 
years, 1910–50, the coefficient on the Second World War/South America interaction 
is significant again and of nearly the same magnitude as in column 3 of table 1.  
In table 3 we continue the analysis with different comparison groups. Columns 1–3 
use the US as the only other exporter in the sample besides the five South 
American countries. Comparing South American export success to the US is a more 
punishing test since continental European trade would have been low during the 
wars. In columns 4–6, we use the UK as the comparison country. While the UK 
was potentially more directly exposed to both wars, it is a natural comparison 
country, since outside wartime it was a leading exporter to South America. In 
columns 7–9, we use the US and the UK together as the only other comparison 
exporters. We split the samples over time, as above, and present results for 1910–
50 as well. In nearly all cases, our results are qualitatively similar to those from 
table 1. The exceptions are when we use the UK as the only comparison country 
and look at the entire period or the 1935–45 period. Here it appears that intra-
South American exports did not grow much faster than exports to the UK and UK 
exports to other destinations during the Second World War—even after controlling 
for supply and demand shocks. Special shipping and wartime supply lines aimed at 
supplying the Allied war effort, thereby lowering trade costs, may help explain this 
result. Overall, tables 1 to 3 suggest that trade costs played a role in determining 
the level of South American integration.  
Part VI 
Assume now, following the prescription and hopes of the economic report on trade 
from ECLA and earlier policy makers, that our South American country pairs could 
have enacted a regional free trade agreement (ECLAC 1956). To conduct such a 
counterfactual, we simplify by restricting our analysis to partial equilibrium. Doing 
so probably biases the expected rise in trade slightly upwards. We will assume that 
all tariffs within our South American sample are eliminated. What would be the 
impact on regional trade under such a scenario compared to the impact of the wars, 
which were mainly short-run reductions in trade costs? While we make no claim for 
the political feasibility of this counterfactual, this analysis, paired with our 
previous results, allows us to gauge how much trade costs mattered for trade. 
ECLA and Blattman et al. provide indications of average tariff rates in ad valorem 
equivalents for several South American countries (Blattman, Hwang, and 
Williamson 2003). For Argentina for the years 1936–40, the value reported by 
ECLA was 28.2 per cent, which is the total tariff revenue divided by dutiable 
imports and dutiable imports accounted for 52 per cent of all imports (ECLAC 
1956). Blattman et al. report a value of 20 per cent for Argentina in the same years. 
For Brazil the number based on ECLA data is 25.6 per cent for the year 1936 
(ECLAC 1956). Blattman et al. report 20.9 per cent. We have no data from ECLA 
for Chile and Peru, but Blattman et al. report values of 32.06 per cent and 17.36 
per cent respectively. Using these values as representative for our five nations, a 
reduction of tariffs from an average of, say, 25 per cent to zero would reduce the 
relative price of imports by 1–(1/1.25) or 20 per cent. The percentage reduction in 
trade costs would have been in the order of 15 per cent, since in figure 7 we see 
that the average South American ad valorem trade cost is 180 per cent in 1913 and 
1945. With a trade elasticity of 8 and an average decline in trade costs of 15 per 
cent, a standard gravity model like that in (Anderson and van Wincoop 2003)’s 
equation 13 would predict exports to within-region partners to be 1.05 log points or 
185 per cent higher (Anderson and van Wincoop 2003, 175). In general equilibrium 
the effect would be smaller, although very comparable.17 Keeping in mind that our 
South American regional trade levels were relatively small suggests that such 
economically large effects are quite plausible. With an elasticity of 3.78, the 
expected increase in exports would be about 57 per cent (Head and Mayer 2015). 
With an elasticity of 12, the rise in trade could have been as high as 497 per cent. It 
would appear that reductions in (relative) regional trade costs, whether via policy 
or better infrastructure, could have done much to boost regional trade significantly, 
even with low trade elasticities. Whether these changes were economically feasible 
is decidedly not a question we can answer in this article. 
For a comparison, focus on 1939–45 and use the assumptions of (Anderson and van 
Wincoop 2003) or the theory outlined above to generate the Head–Ries measure. 
On average the ratio of bilateral exports to the product of pair-GDPs rose by a 
factor of 1.85 or 285 per cent (median factor, 1.51) between 1939 and 1945 in SA5. 
Assuming an elasticity of substitution of 8 and using the standard gravity equation 
formula from (Anderson and van Wincoop 2003), the implied decline in relative 
trade costs within SA5 would be in the order of 9.5 per cent (Anderson and van 
Wincoop 2003, 175). An elasticity of 3.78 yields a decline of 20 per cent and an 
elasticity of 12 yields a decline of 5.5 per cent. As noted above, our Head–Ries trade 
cost measure yields change of c. 13 per cent during the Second World War. All of 
this suggests that the relative trade costs between regional partners during the 
Second World War declined by slightly less than 15 per cent and promoted an 
economically significant rise in trade. Though free trade areas were historically 
planned, and sometimes considerable progress was made in their direction, they 
ultimately never came to fruition.18 Abolishing tariffs on regional partners was 
ostensibly politically infeasible in the 1940s. Our results highlight that had such 
negotiations succeeded and had other factors been held constant, regional trade 
could have increased significantly simply due to lower trade costs. 
Part VII 
We now decompose changes in SA5 bilateral trade in order to assess the 
importance of trade costs versus supply, demand, and third market effects. One 
drawback is that zero trade flows cannot be used. Following Jacks et al., the log 
point change in trade for a dyad is given as:  
                                               
17 For example (Irwin 1998) studies a computable general equilibrium calibration of the 
Smoot–Hawley Tariff and concludes that “when the elasticities are comparable across 
approaches, the general equilibrium calculation of the tariff’s impact on trade volume is 
reasonably close to that of the partial equilibrium estimate”. 
18 Argentina negotiated a customs union with Uruguay (1940), and Chile and Paraguay 
(1943). A treaty with Brazil (1941) aimed for ‘the progressive establishment of such a free-
trade system as … would permit “the constitution of a customs union … where to adjacent 
countries should have the right of accession”’; (ECLAC 1956, 67). The report goes on to note 
that these agreements were not ratified and had no impact on trade. 
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 (Jacks, Meissner, and Novy 2011). 
This decomposition tracks the changes in trade due to changes in output arising 
from higher inputs or greater productivity (the first term), similarity in size of GDP 
(the second term), trade costs (the third term), and multilateral effects (the fourth 
term) that change trade with all partners. The latter explain changes in domestic 
trade relative to total output, such that if the ratio is constant, domestic trade 
expands at the same pace as international trade with all partners and overall 
production. We take a weighted average of the decomposition equation for all 
observations of the South American dyads using the sum of the partners’ GDP 
relative to the total sample GDP as weights.  
Table 4 presents results for the two war periods. In each instance, the bulk of the 
changes are explained by output and trade costs. Changes in multilateral forces 
explain less than 4 per cent of changes during the First World War and almost 
nothing during the Second World War. Similarity in economic size is also a minor 
player. Trade costs (which are falling) play a larger role in the Second World War 
period (53 per cent) than during the First World War. Consequently, the change in 
output explains a greater proportion of the rise in trade among our South American 
countries in the First World War period.  
We interpret these findings as evidence supporting the idea that wartime 
disruptions to global markets made bilateral trade within South America 
significantly less costly in relative terms. Trade costs mattered for regional 
integration. Second, boosting output by adding factors of production, or (less 
plausibly in these years) raising productivity, could also have contributed 
substantially to intra-South American trade. This finding holds constant what is 
happening in world markets. This suggests a role for competitiveness in boosting 
regional trade. After accounting for the size terms, multilateral forces play a very 
small role. We conclude that it was not simply the disappearance of European 
competitors that allowed for greater integration in our South American countries. 
For multilateral effects to have been important, exports to all partners would have 
had to change faster than total output. While South America gained market share 
with some partners, trade plummeted in others—especially in Europe. The 
structure of the demand system forces us to attribute changes in trade to changes 
in trade costs and economic size as the leading explanations for rising trade shares 
in South America rather than third market effects.  
Part VIII 
As argued above, there is some evidence that trade costs mattered for South 
American integration. Despite geographic proximity and shared institutional 
backgrounds, many of these countries traded more heavily with distant industrial 
powerhouses such as the US, the UK, France, and Germany. Shipping between 
Europe and South America seems to have been less costly than international 
shipping within the region.  
For Brazil in 1910 freight rates per ton of cotton goods via the English-flagged 
Booth Lines or the Lloyd Brazileiro were quoted as follows: Liverpool–Belem (Para) 
(4,290 miles) $12.76; New York–Belem (3,380 miles) $14.52; and Rio de Janeiro–
Belem (2,406 miles) $12.27. Freight rates per ton of cotton goods via ship to 
Manaus were as follows: Liverpool–Manaus (5,150 miles) $16.04; New York–
Manaus (4,240 miles) $17.16; and Rio de Janeiro–Manaus (3,266 miles) $34.16 
(Clark 1909).  
International shipping companies provided high tonnage shipping services with or 
without fixed timetables but charged anti-competitive rates in the so-called 
conference agreements. Still, no country in South America had any significant 
merchant marine fleet and this raised rates even more.19 Most trade between 
nations such as Brazil and Argentina would have had to have been carried by 
European or American vessels stopping in Brazilian ports and then carrying on to 
Argentinian or Uruguayan ports. Not all American or European freight companies 
travelled such routes. Otherwise, regional trade relied on infrequent departures of 
small-tonnage vessels flying regional flags.20 
The low level of regional trade due to the low capacity of local shipping is also 
evident in Brazilian trade statistics from 1903, slightly before our period (IBGE 
2013). In a regression of the logarithm of tons shipped on the logarithm of shipping 
distance, the coefficient on distance is 0.96 (standard error of 0.46, p-value = 0.06). 
We can then decompose total tons shipped into the number of ships landed and the 
number of tons per landing. In a regression of the logarithm of the number of ships 
landed on distance, the coefficient on distance is small (0.04, standard error of 0.39) 
and not statistically significant. The number of tons per ship landed is still 
(strongly) positively correlated with distance (coefficient = 0.92, standard error = 
0.16, p-value = 0.00). In effect, European landings involved larger vessels, which 
presumably pushed down the ton-kilometre unit shipping costs.21 
Although intra-South American freight rates might have been high, the world wars 
changed relative freight rates dramatically. The US Bureau of Foreign Commerce 
studied shipping at the outbreak of the Second World War, noting that the rise in 
freight rates from the US to the east coast of South America was only a fraction of 
the rise in European freights to the same area. In particular, freights on liners 
from the US rose 20 per cent, and tramp freights for coal (on non-US and non-
Brazilian flagged vessels) bound for the east coast of South America rose 260 per 
cent (Sanderson 1940). The rise in freight rates on automobiles (boxed) between 
July 1939 and April 1940 from the US Atlantic ports to Antwerp was 706 per cent. 
Between US Atlantic ports and Rio, it was 22 per cent. On tobacco the rises were 
329 per cent versus 12 per cent. For Le Havre the increases were 158 per cent 
(automobiles) and 185 per cent (tobacco); for London the rises were 150 per cent 
                                               
19 (Sanderson 1940), reported that ‘with the exception of a few Argentine ships which 
operate between Argentina and Paraguay, Uruguay and Brazil, the country’s foreign trade 
is transported by ships of other nationalities. Chilean official trade statistics showed that 
for 1912 less than 10% of total tonnage was on South American ships and less than 20% of 
the vessels were from South America. 
20 During the Second World War, freights and other transport costs for Argentina–Brazil 
trade were around 25% of the export value, while for UK–Brazil and US–Brazil trade such 
costs were around 20%; (IBGE 1970). 
21 Chilean trade was carried mainly by European ships, which were bigger than South 
American ships. German and British ships transported, on average, more than 3,000 tons 
per shipment compared to the 1,500 tons carried by Chilean ships, 1,600 tons by 
Argentinian ships, and 2,600 tons by Peruvian ships (OCE 1925). 
(automobiles) and 200 per cent (tobacco). Automobile freight rates to Valparaiso 
from US Gulf ports had not moved between these two dates. Meanwhile canned 
goods freights from the US west coast to London had risen 50 per cent, while those 
to Buenos Aires had risen only 11 per cent. It was also observed that ‘compared 
with ships of other nationalities, American vessels since the outbreak … have been 
fairly plentiful on the River Plate, and rates to the US are said not to have been 
abnormally high’ (Sanderson 1940). Based on this, it is very likely that relative 
freight costs had risen much more on European–South American and American–
European routes than on US–South American routes and regional routes.  
Quantity rationing in shipping also occurred, which added non-pecuniary and 
indirect costs to shipping and hence to trade. On the Argentine-British routes, 
many ships were given official rates and essentially commandeered. On neutral 
vessels, rates were even higher, but delays and inspections caused logistical 
problems. Insurance charges for boats not travelling in convoy also contributed to 
high trade costs. In Peru, where time charters and liners dominated, a number of 
the shipping conferences that had previously served Peru (for example, 
European/South Pacific Magellan) ceased to function. The disappearance of anti-
competitive pricing did not mean lower rates, though. This route reported rate rises 
of 50 per cent to 400 per cent. On the other hand, traffic between Peru and the US 
witnessed rate rises of 20 per cent. Since the liners that served Peru from the US 
often served other nations such as Chile and also the Rio de la Plata, regional rates 
would be expected to rise much more modestly than on the European routes 
(Sanderson 1940). 
In terms of trade policy, many significant changes took place in the 1910–50 period. 
Chile raised tariff rates on a host of industrial products, beginning in the 1920s, 
which depressed trade. The Great Depression led to the imposition of long-lasting 
exchange controls. Brazil ordered exporters to sell 30 per cent of earnings to the 
government at the official (overvalued) exchange rate. The executive in Brazil 
exercised considerable discretion in granting reductions and permits to importers 
(Bulmer-Thomas 2014). Argentina and Chile also implemented exchange controls 
in the 1930s that were equally protective of domestic producers in selected 
industries.22  
Contrary to these forces which suppressed South American trade, many attempts 
were made to improve trade relations in the 1930s and onwards.23 We explore 
whether some of these policy changes are associated with higher trade. To do so, we 
have collected and digitized new data on commercial and diplomatic ties for 
Argentina and 19 of its trade partners.24  Our new variable includes a wide variety 
of diplomatic initiatives, such as friendship agreements, trade facilities, 
regulations on migration, railway connections at the border, diplomatic post 
exchanges, and mutual recognition of professional training levels or cultural 
promotion (Ministerior de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto (República Argentina) 
2014). The pace at which Argentina signed these treaties increased from the mid-
1930s, with a much stronger rise with Latin American trade partners than with 
non-Latin American countries. From the 1930s onwards, ECLA described trade 
                                               
22 For Chile, see (Díaz and Wagner 2004); for Argentina, see (Taylor 2014). 
23 The numerous trade agreements concluded by Argentina … before the Great Depression 
… seem as a general rule to have had a favourable effect upon the expansion of its trade’ 
(ECLAC 1956). 
24 These are Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and 
the US. 
policy as ‘bilateral reciprocity’ rather than the nineteenth-century multilateral 
approach (ECLAC 1956). We have counted the cumulative number of treaties 
signed with each partner and used this as an explanatory variable in a PPML 
regression of Argentina’s exports to and imports from each of these partners 
between 1910 and 1950. Table 5 presents our results. 
Table 5, column 1 shows that the cumulative number of treaties was a positive and 
statistically significant determinant of trade. Columns 2 and 3 show that the South 
American/Second World War interaction term captures some of the reduction in 
trade costs due to closer diplomatic ties, since the addition of the treaty variable to 
the regression in column 3 reduces the magnitude of the interaction term for the 
Second World War. This is consistent with the idea that changes in Argentinean 
trade policy, ‘aimed at the consolidation of the new trade channels’ (that is, 
regional trade), occurred during the 1930s and the 1940s (ECLAC 1956). This point 
reveals two things. The first is that despite this concurrent re-orientation of trade 
policy in the ‘event window’ that we study, which could affect our assessment of 
changes in relative trade costs during the war, there is still a positive rise in 
regional trade during the war. The second concerns the endogeneity of trade policy. 
When we allow for country-pair specific fixed effects. We find a positive point 
estimate on the cumulative treaty indicator of 0.003, but it is not statistically 
significant. Trade treaties were potentially endogenous and merely codifying 
economic forces already in play. It is plausible to conclude that Argentina’s 
diplomatic relations had little effect on the direction of trade and that greater trade 
during the dislocations of the 1930s and 1940s led to a higher likelihood of signing 
a treaty. This is reassuring in the context of our research design using the shock of 
the wars, since those shocks are much more plausibly exogenous. 
Part IX 
The textile industry can shed some light on regional trade via reduced trade costs 
and/or improved competitiveness.25 During the wars, production and intra-regional 
trade in these goods expanded significantly.26 Figure 8 shows the shares for 
Chilean textile importation. Over the long run, British imports tended to fall while 
the US increased its market share in Chile. Japanese imports increased after the 
Great Depression but collapsed during the war. South American countries 
increased their share during the First World War, but a stronger boom occurred in 
the 1940s. Although Argentina was predominant during the First World War, 
during the 1940s it was dramatically replaced by Brazil. International trade in the 
region has sometimes been described as a battle between Argentina and Brazil for 
regional political and economic hegemony, both trying to escape from the 
domination of the UK and the US. From the 1930s, both competed for regional 
market share by signing bilateral treaties and through ad hoc incentives embedded 
in exchange controls and micro-changes to tariff lines. Whatever the case, Brazil 
clearly had a leg up in the textile industry, and its local industry had long been 
                                               
25 Textile production is a quintessential leading sector in a nascent industrialization 
process. Textiles represented an opportunity to move away from commodities to higher 
value-added exports. A product-cycle trend might have left space for competition from 
regional producers. Brazil had the most sophisticated and largest textile industry in Latin 
America, with a domestic textile industry ranked seventh in terms of production in 1918. 
See (Huberman 2013). Additionally, according to (Betrán and Huberman 2016), Brazil 
reportedly had 50,000 looms, the tenth-largest figure in the world in 1913. 
26 On expansion during the First World War, see (Albert and Henderson 1981). 
able to compete (that is, from the First World War) against European competitors 
in its domestic market in the coarser grades (Clark 1909). 
British textiles collapsed after 1941, providing an opportunity for US and regional 
exporters to increase their market share. However, far from providing a long-
lasting boost to industry, any gains were temporary. Import shares from non-
traditional supplies declined swiftly when the conflict ended. 
Argentina and Brazil account for the greater part of South American trade. Even 
nowadays their bilateral trade is the most important part of Mercosur. Figure 9 
shows how, during both wars, Brazil clearly increased its exports to the 
Argentinean market. 
Figure 10 shows that prior to the 1930s, Brazilian exports to Argentina were 
mainly of mate de hierba buena. Mate’s trade share fell, and that of Brazilian 
textiles increased. Mate had no easily substitutable foreign goods. On the contrary, 
textiles were probably easily substitutable for foreign goods.  
As an indication of Brazilian competitiveness, figure 11 shows the share of output 
going to the domestic market, the share for export, and the value of imports. Data 
are expressed in quantities (metres of fabric). The left vertical axis shows data for 
industrial production and apparent consumption (domestic production – exports + 
imports). The right vertical axis shows the trade data. Eighty per cent of domestic 
consumption was covered by domestic production during the entire period. Imports 
were around 15 per cent before the First World War, falling to around 5 per cent 
during the conflict and remaining at that level during the 1920s. After the early 
1930s, textile imports dropped, ultimately claiming an insignificant share of the 
domestic market. Significant declines in international trade costs are visible. While 
production in metres increased by about 70 per cent between 1932 and 1945, 
exports rose 292 per cent between 1932 and 1945. Between 1939 and 1945 the 
figures are 21 per cent for production and a growth factor of 12 for exports. Textile 
exports were less than 1 per cent of domestic production until 1939. By 1942 Brazil 
exported 14 per cent of domestic production—half to Argentina.27 
The First World War also led to a significant increase in exports, but imports from 
abroad were greater and increasing in the early 1920s. According to Huberman, the 
period before 1925 was one of increasing capital investments and an upward trend 
in the quality of textile production, associated with stricter labour regulation 
(Huberman 2013). Starting from 1925, foreign markets collapsed and the country 
began to adopt an inward-looking development strategy, leading to lower imports 
and a higher share of national production in the total consumption of textiles.  
Brazil’s path to success might also have been founded on an improvement in 
quality, rather than simply on price competition. Unit export values, shown in 
table 6, can be used as an indirect approach. From 1934 to 1946, the trend was 
upwards, despite uneven global demand during the war years. This evidence fits 
well with Huberman’s explanation, but goes beyond it by providing some evidence 
from the 1930s and beyond. 
                                               
27 A similar pattern is observed in the case of Chile during the First World War and the 
1920s. Most domestic production of textiles stagnated and the imports’ importance in total 
consumption remained stable. See (Palma 1979). 
Part X 
Viewed from a long-run perspective, greater regional trade in Latin America seems 
to be Sisyphean. Its historical trajectory is currently part of many international 
debates on the merits of regional trade. Liberalization efforts since the 1990s have 
not been sufficient to promote strong regional integration. In 2000 the share of 
total imports for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay coming from other regional 
countries equalled 18 per cent, versus a share of 27 per cent coming from the 
NAFTA countries. Between 1910 and 1950 our data show that the share of imports 
from South America averaged 11 per cent, with a maximum of 24.5 per cent in 
1944. While some progress has been made, more distant trade partners remain 
more important than neighbouring countries in this region. Recently some authors 
have argued that more attention should be paid to reducing trade costs by raising 
investment in regional transport infrastructure (Mesquita Moreira et al. 2008).  
Our results from the past affirm that trade costs mattered historically. We find 
that trade costs were always higher between these countries than with more 
distant partners, but that during the wars these fell sharply. These shocks made it 
relatively more costly to trade with those nations directly involved in the war. We 
estimate that under a free trade scenario, comparable to the decline in trade costs 
from the war, the countries in our sample might have been able to double exports 
to each regional partner. Other policies to improve transport and communication 
links could have had similar effects, given our direct evidence.  
We also take an approach to this question using data from the textiles industry. 
During the First World War, substitution was mainly focused on the domestic 
market. However, during the Second World War, South America increased exports 
to close neighbours. Nevertheless, this increase was not persistent. Once the war 
was over, these gains in market share were surrendered. South American nations 
failed to commit to permanently low trade barriers by signing a definitive regional 
trade agreement, much less going in for a full-fledged customs union. Without 
these incentives, the necessary investments required to establish export links to 
these markets were not made. Without lower trade costs, the entry of firms 
producing new products that could compete with extra-regional substitutes was 
limited. Again, relative trade costs seem to have been the drivers here. It remains 
to be seen whether greater regional market access could have provided the 
foundation for enhanced productivity performance or whether trade policy to 
shelter domestic producers might have produced successful productivity growth. 
References 
Albert, Bill, and Paul Henderson. 1981. “Latin America and the Great War: A 
Preliminary Survey of Developments in Chile, Peru, Argentina and Brazil.” 
World Development 9 (8): 717–34.  
Anderson, James E., and Eric van Wincoop. 2003. “Gravity with Gravitas: A 
Solution to the Border Puzzle.” American Economic Review 93: 170–92. 
Bértola, Luís, and José Antonio Ocampo. 2012. The Economic Development of 
Latin America since Independence. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford 
University Press. 
Betrán, Concepción, and Michael Huberman. 2016. “International Competition in 
the First Wave of Globalization: New Evidence on the Margins of Trade.” The 
Economic History Review 69 (1): 258–87 
Blattman, Christopher, Jason Hwang, and Jeffrey G Williamson. 2003. “The Terms 
of Trade and Economic Growth in the Periphery 1870-1983.” NBER Working 
Paper Series 9940. 
Bulmer-Thomas, Victor. 2014. The Economic History of Latin America since 
Independence. Academic. Cambridge University Press. 
Carreras-Marín, Anna, and Marc Badia-Miró. 2008. “La Fiabilidad de La 
Asignación Geográfica En Las Estadísticas de Comercio Exterior: América 
Latina y El Caribe (1908–1930).” Revista de Historia Económica - Journal of 
Iberian and Latin American Economic History 26 (3): 355–73.  
Carreras-Marín, Anna, Marc Badia-Miró, and José Peres Cajías. 2013. 
“Intraregional Trade in South America, 1912–1950: The Cases of Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Peru.” Economic History of Developing Regions 28 
(2): 1–26. 
Carreras-Marín, Anna, and Agustina Rayes. 2015. “La Fiabilidad En La 
Distribución Geográfica de Las Exportaciones Argentinas, 1875-1913.” 
America Latina En La Historia Económica 22 (3). Instituto de Investigaciones 
Dr. José María Luis Mora: 177–212. 
Castillo, Ramon S. 1979. “El Plan de Reactivación Económica Ante El Honorable 
Senado.” Desarrollo Económico 19 (75): 403–26. 
Clark, William Alexander Graham. 1909. Cotton Goods in Latin America. 
Washington D.C., USA: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Debowicz, Dario, and Paul Segal. 2014. “Structural Change in Argentina, 1935–
1960: The Role of Import Substitution and Factor Endowments.” The Journal 
of Economic History 74 (01). Cambridge University Press: 230–58.  
Díaz, José, and Gert Wagner. 2004. “Política Comercial: Instrumentos y 
Antecedentes. Chile En Los Siglos XIX y XX.” PUC Economics Institute 
Working Paper 223. Santiago de Chile, Chile. 
ECLAC. 1956. Study of Inter-Latin-American Trade. New York, USA: United 
Nations Publications. 
Federico, Giovanni, and Antonio Tena-Junguito. 1991. “On the Accuracy of Foreign 
Trade Statistics (1909-1935): Morgenstern Revisited.” Explorations in 
Economic History 28 (3): 259―273. 
———. 2017. “A Tale of Two Globalizations: Gains from Trade and Openness 1800–
2010.” Review of World Economics, March, 27. 
Head, Keith, and Thierry Mayer. 2015. “Gravity Equations: Workhorse,Toolkit, 
and Cookbook.” In Handbook of International Economics., edited by Elhanan 
Helpman, Kenneth Rogoff, and Gita Gopinath, 131–95. Oxford: BV: Elsevier 
B.V. 
Head, Keith, and J Ries. 2001. “Increasing Returns versus National Product 
Differentiation as an Explanation for the Pattern of US-Canada Trade.” 
American Economic Review 91 (4): 858–76.  
Hirschman, Albert O. 1968. “The Political Economy of Import-Substituting 
Industrialization in Latin America.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 82 
(1): 1–32. 
Huberman, Michael. 2013. “One World of Labour Regulation, Two Worlds of Trade: 
Examples of Belgium and Brazil.” European Review of Economic History 17 
(3): 251–71. 
IBGE. 1970. Series Estatisticas Retrospectivas. Rio de Janeiro, Brasil., Brasil.: 
Fundação Getúlio Vargas - Instituto Brasileiro de Economia. 
———. 2013. “Anuário Estatístico Do Brasil.” Anuário Estatístico Do Brasil. 
http://biblioteca.ibge.gov.br/d_detalhes.php?id=720. 
Irwin, Douglas A. 1998. “The Smoot-Hawley Tariff: A Quantitative Assessment.” 
The Review of Economics and Statistics 80 (2): 326–34.  
Jacks, David S., Christopher M. Meissner, and Dennis Novy. 2010. “Trade Costs in 
the First Wave of Globalization.” Explorations in Economic History 47 (2): 
127–41. 
———. 2011. “Trade Booms, Trade Busts, and Trade Costs.” Journal of 
International Economics 83 (2): 185–201. 
Jacks, David S., Christopher M Meissner, and Dennis Novy. 2008. “Trade Costs, 
1870 - 2000.” American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 98 (2): 529–
34. 
Maizels, A. 1965. Industrial Growth and World Trade: An Empirical Study of 
Trends in Production, Consumption and Trade in Manufactures from 1899-
1959, with a Discussion of Probable Future Trends. University Press. 
Mesquita Moreira, Maurício, Christian Volpe, Juan S. Blyde, and Christian 
Martincus Volpe. 2008. Unclogging the Arteries. The Impact of Transport 
Costs on Latin American and Caribbean Trade. David Rockefeller Center for 
Latin American Studies. Washington, D.C.: David Rockefeller Center for Latin 
American Studies. 
Ministerior de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto (República Argentina). 2014. 
“Biblioteca Digital de Tratados.” http://tratados.cancilleria.gob.ar/. 
Ocampo, Jose Antonio, and Jaime Ros. 2011. “Shifting Paradigms in Latin 
America’s Economic Development.” In The Oxford Handbook of Latin 
American Economics, edited by José Antonio Ocampo and Jaime Ros, 3–25. 
Oxford University Press. 
OCE. 1925. Anuario Estadístico de La República de Chile 1925. Santiago, Chile.: 
Oficina Central de Estadística, Sociedad Imprenta y Litografía Universo. 
Palma, José Gabriel. 1979. “Growth and Structure of Chilean Manufacturing 
Industry from 1830 to 1935.” University of Oxford. 
Peres Cajias, Jose, Marc Badia-Miró, and Anna Carreras-Marín. 2012. 
“Intraregional Trade in South America, 1913-50. Economic Linkages before 
Institutional Agreements.” Documents de Treball. Facultat Economia i 
Empresa. Universitat de Barcelona. 270. 
Pinilla, Vicente, and Gema Aparicio. 2015. “Navigation in Troubled Waters: South 
American Exports of Food and Agricultural Products, 1900-1950.” Revista de 
Historia Económica - Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History 
33 (2). Cambridge University Press: 223–55. 
Sanderson, Albert Edward. 1940. Wartime Control of Ocean Freight Rates in 
Foreign Trade : A World Survey. Trade Promotion Series, n. 212. Washington 
D.C., USA: United States Government Printing Office. 
Silva, J. M. C. Santos, and Silvana Tenreyro. 2006. “The Log of Gravity.” The 
Review of Economics and Statistics 88 (4): 641–58. 
Taylor, Alan M. 1998. “On the Costs of Inward-Looking Development: Price 
Distortions, Growth, and Divergence in Latin America.” The Journal of 
Economic History 58: 1–28. 
Taylor, Alan M. 2014. “The Argentina Paradox: Microexplanations and 
Macropuzzles.” NBER Working Paper. 
Tena-Junguito, Antonio, and Henry Willebald. 2013. “On the Accuracy of Export 
Growth in Argentina, 1870–1913.” Economic History of Developing Regions 28 
(1): 28–68. 
Vilella, A. V., and W. Suzigan. 1973. Política Do Governo e Crescimento Da 
Economia Brasileira, 1889-1975. Vol. 10. Rio de Janeiro, Brasil.: IPEA/INPES. 
Tables 
Table 1. Bilateral exports, 1910–50 
































































 (0.41) (0.66) (0.37) (0.37) (0.35) (0.37) (0.37) 
Both in Latin America x First World War 0.85*** –- 0.60*** 0.52** 0.44* 0.60** 0.59** 
 (0.18)  (0.23) (0.25) (0.23) (0.24) (0.25) 
Both in Latin America x 1920s – – – – – – −0.05 
       (0.17) 
Both in Latin America x Great Depression 
(1929–38) 
– – – – – −0.02 – 
      (0.15)  
Both in Latin America x Second World War – 1.07*** 1.17*** 0.73* 1.61*** 1.16*** 1.15*** 













 (0.09) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) 
Both on the gold standard 
−0.80*
** 
0.74* −0.05 −0.07 −0.06 −0.05 −0.05 
 (0.22) (0.42) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) 
Shared border 0.80*** 1.22** 0.78*** 0.77*** 0.75*** 0.78*** 0.78*** 
 (0.17) (0.56) (0.22) (0.23) (0.20) (0.22) (0.22) 
Shared language 0.14 0.72*** 0.28* 0.29* 0.34** 0.28* 0.28* 
 (0.14) (0.21) (0.17) (0.17) (0.14) (0.17) (0.17) 
No. of observations 1,296 1,584 5,904 5,412 5,412 5,904 5,904 
Year x country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on country pairs are reported in 
parentheses. Time-varying country fixed effects are included in all columns. 
Method of estimation is PPML. ***p-value <0.01, **p-value <0.05, *p-value <0.1. 
Shipping distance is in nautical miles between principal ports (time-varying due to 
the opening of the Panama Canal). 
Sources: Our dataset relies on (Carreras-Marín, Badia-Miró, and Peres Cajías 
2013; Jacks, Meissner, and Novy 2011).  
 
Table 2. Bilateral exports, 13 countries, 1910–50, allowing for pre-trends 
  Nominal exports  






Both countries in Latin America x trend 0.08* 0.18*** 0.00 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.01) 
Both in Latin America  −1.70*** −7.26*** −1.44*** 
 (0.48) (1.63) (0.47) 
Both in Latin America x First World War 0.46*** – 0.65*** 
 (0.16)  (0.16) 
Both in Latin America x Second World War – 0.07 1.15*** 
  (0.32) (0.23) 
ln(distance) −0.27*** −0.33*** −0.31*** 
 (0.09) (0.13) (0.10) 
Both on the gold standard −0.80*** 0.75* −0.05 
 (0.22) (0.42) (0.10) 
Shared border 0.80*** 1.22** 0.78*** 
 (0.17) (0.56) (0.22) 
Shared language 0.14 0.72*** 0.28* 
 (0.14) (0.21) (0.17) 
    
No. of observations 1,296 1,584 5,904 
Year x country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: As for tab. 1. 
Sources: As for tab. 1.  
Table 3. Bilateral exports for South American countries, US, and UK, 1910–50 
 Value of nominal exports 
 
SA5 + US SA5+ US SA5 + US SA5+UK SA5 + UK SA5+UK 
SA5+US & 
UK 




Both countries in Latin America −2.15*** −0.73** −0.63 −2.44*** −1.60*** −1.16** −2.02*** −0.89*** −0.70* 
 (0.23) (0.34) (0.41) (0.47) (0.48) (0.47) (0.22) (0.31) (0.38) 
Both in Latin America x First World War  0.82*** –- 0.94*** 0.44** – 0.50* 0.63*** – 0.70*** 
 (0.12)  (0.20) (0.20)  (0.26) (0.17)  (0.21) 
Both in Latin America x Second World War – 1.25*** 1.54*** – −0.09 −0.17 – 1.10*** 1.29*** 
  (0.26) (0.22)  (0.38) (0.29)  (0.21) (0.20) 
ln(distance) −1.08*** −0.93*** −0.74** −0.30** −0.40*** −0.25** −0.26*** −0.27** −0.16* 
 (0.24) (0.33) (0.34) (0.15) (0.14) (0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) 
Both on the gold standard −0.24 −0.01 −0.1 −0.51*  0.06 −0.70** 0.15 −0.08 
 (0.36) (0.26) (0.13) (0.27)  (0.15) (0.29) (0.21) (0.11) 
Shared border 1.49*** −0.35 0.08 2.11*** 0 0.46 2.17*** 0.36 0.69 
 (0.28) (0.47) (0.56) (0.25) (0.28) (0.38) (0.25) (0.30) (0.44) 
Shared language −0.25 0.37 −0.14 −0.55* 0.32 −0.18 −0.36** 0.27 −0.23 
 (0.21) (0.30) (0.26) (0.31) (0.28) (0.27) (0.18) (0.24) (0.21) 
No. of observations 720 792 2,952 720 792 2,952 840 924 3,444 
Year x country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: SA5 includes five different South American countries. Robust standard errors clustered on the country pair are reported in 
parentheses. Time-varying country fixed effects are included in all specifications. ***p-value <0.01, **p-value <0.05, *p-value <0.1. 
Shipping distance is in nautical miles between principal ports (time-varying due to the opening of the Panama Canal). 
Sources: As for tab. 1.  
 
Table 4. Decomposition of trade changes in South America during two world wars 
Variable Avg. change, 1913–19 Contribution from 
each variable % x 100 
Avg. change, 1939–45 Contribution from 
each variable % x 100  
Total trade growth =  1.75 100 1.95 100 
Change in output + 1.35 77.29 0.89 45.69 
Change in trade costs + 0.32 18.26 1.05 53.53 
Change in income similarity + 0.02 0.86 0.01 0.74 
Change in multilateral factor 0.06 3.59 0.00 0.04 
Notes: Changes are calculated as the average of the change in the logarithms of each variable. They are presented in log points. These 
changes are weighted averages for nine South American dyads (1913–19) and 10 South American dyads (1939–45). Weights are the sum 
of the dyad’s GDP values. 
Sources: As for tab. 1. 
 
Table 5. Argentina, bilateral imports and exports with cumulative treaties signed, 1910–50 
 Nominal exports of Argentina or imports to Argentina 
Partner in Latin America −0.65* −0.89* −0.87** – 
 [0.393] [0.462] [0.402]  
Partner in Latin America x First World War – 0.33 0.98** 0.69** 
  [0.242] [0.393] [0.316] 
Partner in Latin America x 1929–38 – −0.18* 0.22 −0.1 
  [0.100] [0.215] [0.113] 
Exporter in Latin America x Second World War – 0.90
*** 0.48* 0.86
*** 
  [0.215] [0.272] [0.191] 
Cumulative treaties 0.04** – 0.04** 0.003 
 [0.017]  [0.019] [0.009] 
ln(distance) −1.28* −1.21 −1.28** – 
 [0.656] [0.810] [0.651]  
Shared border −1.87* −0.7 −1.88* – 
 [0.991] [0.906] [0.982]  
Both on the gold standard  0.60** 0.51** 0.59** 0.13 
 [0.259] [0.251] [0.252] [0.180] 
Shared language −0.61** −0.27 −0.62** – 
 [0.285] [0.252] [0.297]  
ln(GDP) exporter 0.62*** 0.69*** 0.62*** 1.30*** 
 [0.080] [0.074] [0.082] [0.204] 
ln (GDP) importer 0.59*** 0.66*** 0.59*** 1.27*** 
 [0.134] [0.142] [0.135] [0.249] 
No. of observations 1,546 1,546 1,546 1,546 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-pair fixed effects No No No Yes 
Notes: Estimation is by PPML. Source countries include five South American countries and 15 non-South American countries. Robust 
standard errors clustered by country pair are reported in brackets. Time dummies are included but not reported. ***p-value <0.01, **p-
value <0.05, *p-value < 0.1. Shipping distance is in nautical miles between principal ports (time-varying due to the opening of the 
Panama Canal). 
Sources: Our dataset relies on (Carreras-Marín, Badia-Miró, and Peres Cajías 2013; Jacks, Meissner, and Novy 2011). For the treaties, 
see (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores). 
 
Table 6. Index of unit values for Brazilian exports of cotton fabrics (constant local 
currency prices 1970 = 100 per ton) 
Year Unit values Year Unit values 
1915 1.305 1932 8.202 
1916 1.498 1933 3.545 
1917 1.945 1934 8.424 
1918 3.230 1935 10.890 
1919 3.622 1936 17.537 
1920 5.985 1937 19.638 
1921 4.449 1938 22.076 
1922 4.545 1939 18.385 
1923 8.934 1940 22.475 
1924 10.602 1941 30.039 
1925 9.890 1942 48.701 
1926 13.263 1943 71.015 
1927 10.073 1944 111.031 
1928 8.633 1945 154.965 
1929 8.742 1946 164.502 
1930 8.345 1947 304.172 
1931 7.581   
Sources: Official Brazilian trade statistics, various years. 
Figures 
Figure 1. Share of intra-regional trade in various regions, 1900–59 
 
Notes: South America, non-USD bloc: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, 
and Uruguay. Latam-USD bloc: Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Venezuela, and Virgin Islands. Continental Europe: Austria, Belgium–
Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Germany (beginning 1948 data for the Federal 
Republic), Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and 
Turkey. East/south-east Asia: China, Japan, Afghanistan, Taiwan, Korea, 
Philippines, Ryukyu Islands, and Thailand. North America: US and Canada. 
Source: United Nations, International Trade Statistics. 
 
Figure 2. Exports to five South American nations relative to total exports for five 


















Note: Shaded areas indicate world war periods, 1914–19 and 1939–45. 
Source: (Carreras-Marín, Badia-Miró, and Peres Cajías 2013). 
 
Figure 3. Share of each country in total imports of other four countries, 1912–50 
 
Note: Figure shows the share of imports coming from each source country in the 
total imports of four other South American countries in our sample.  
Sources: Each country’s official trade statistics, various years. For details, see 
online app. S1. 
 
Figure 4. Export shares to South American destinations by source 
 
Note: Figure shows the share of exports to the other four South American 
destinations in our sample. 
Sources: Each country’s official trade statistics, various years. For details, see 
online app. S1.   
 
Figure 5. Shares of the total rise in South American exports to South American 





















































































Notes: The sum of the height of the bars is 100% and reflects the total percentage 
share of the exports from the country on the x-axis in the change in regional 
exports. For each country we calculate the three-year average of total exports to 
the other four countries in the region, centred on 1939 and 1945. We also calculate 
the three-year centred average of total exports from all five South American 
countries to the other four countries in the region for 1939 and 1945. Next we 
calculate the percentage of the cumulative rise in South American–South American 
trade from a source as the ratio of the latter to the former. This yields the height of 
each bar corresponding to the total share for each source country. Negative values 
indicate absolute declines in exports between two countries. Each source country’s 
bar is broken into four parts reflecting the proportion of the total change in intra-
South American trade accounted for by exports to a particular country from the 
given source on the x-axis. The large white bar for Argentina (ARG) in the column 
for Brazil suggests that 44% of the total rise in intra-South American trade 
between 1939 and 1945 is accounted for by the rise of exports from Brazil to 
Argentina.   
Sources: Each country’s official trade statistics, various years. For details, see 
online app. S1.   
 
Figure 6. Regional trade intensity for imports of textile goods: Chile, 1913–50 
 
Notes: Regional trade indicator ‘R’ is defined as the share of Chilean imports in a 
particular industry (in this case, textiles) from a given region in the total imports of 
that industry to the share of total Chilean imports coming from that region. These 
regions are South America, Europe (Germany, France, and Belgium), the UK, and 
the US. 
Sources: Chilean official trade statistics, various years.  
 
Figure 7. Average trade costs for South American country pairs and South 
American/non-South American major trade partners, 1910–50 
 
Notes: Trade costs are not defined when trade flows equal zero. We therefore 
include only data from a balanced sample of country pairs. Countries in South 
America include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Peru. Other countries are 
the US, the UK, Germany, France, Japan, Spain, and Italy. 
Source: Trade costs are calculated as in (Jacks, Meissner, and Novy 2011). 
 
Figure 8. Chilean textile import shares by source, 1916–50 
 
Notes: Figures are three-year moving averages. Underlying data begin in 1913. 
Brazil is included in South American trade and then reported separately. 
Continental Europe includes Germany, France, and Belgium.  
Sources: Trade statistical abstracts for various years. 
 















Share of Exports Share of Imports
 
Notes: Figures represent Brazil’s exports to Argentina as a share of total Brazilian 
exports and Brazil’s imports from Argentina as a share of total Brazilian imports.  
Sources: Foreign trade statistical abstracts, various years. 
 





















Sources: Foreign trade statistical abstracts, various years. 
 
 
Figure 11. Industrial textile production, domestic absorption, exports, and imports 














































National production (left) Domestic absorption (left) Imports (right) Exports (right)
 
Note: Domestic absorption is defined as total domestic production + imports – 
exports. 
Source: (Vilella and Suzigan 1973)  
